政府间竞争影响城市土地市场化水平的双边效应研究：基于财政竞争和引资竞争的不同作用

研究目的:本文将政府间竞争划分为财政竞争和引资竞争,比较两者对城市土地市场化水平影响的大小,分析政府间竞争与城市土地市场化水平之间的关系。研究方法:基于2003—2016年全国284个地级市的面板数据,利用双边随机前沿模型测算财政竞争和引资竞争对城市土地市场化水平的影响。研究结果:财政竞争对城市土地市场化水平具有正向效应,提高了城市土地市场化水平1.61%;引资竞争对城市土地市场化水平具有负向效应,降低了城市土地市场化水平12.51%;政府间竞争总体上降低了城市土地市场化水平10.90%。时间趋势表明,政府间竞争对城市土地市场化水平的抑制作用呈现波动下降的状态。研究结论:政府间竞争降低了城市土地市场化水平。     

Economic policy uncertainty and stock price crash risk

This paper studies the impact of economic policy uncertainty on stock price crash risk using data from China. We develop a new index to measure Chinese economic policy uncertainty and find that economic policy uncertainty has a remarkable positive effect on stock price crash risk. However, the effect reverses later. The results also indicate that the positive effect of economic policy uncertainty on stock price crash risk is more prominent for state‐owned enterprises. Moreover, this effect is more prominent for firms with higher information asymmetry and firms with greater disagreement among investors, indicating that economic policy uncertainty affects crash risk through two mechanisms: managers’ concealment of bad news and investors’ heterogeneous beliefs.     

桑叶配方颗粒物质基准研究

桑叶配方颗粒迄今尚没有统一的质量标准。为提升桑叶配方颗粒的内在质量,对其物质基准评价方法进行了研究。选取具有代表性产地的15批桑叶制备物质基准,采用高效液相色谱法,以芦丁、异槲皮苷、紫云英苷作为评价指标,确定桑叶物质基准的出膏率范围、标志性成分含量及转移率范围,采用超高效液相色谱法,建立物质基准UPLC特征图谱,并对其主要成分进行指认。结果表明:15批物质基准中,芦丁转移率为19.94%～34.05%,异槲皮苷转移率为11.67%～43.58%,紫云英苷转移率为10.73%～43.05%;物质基准特征图谱中,标定了14个共有峰,指认出7个色谱峰,分别为新绿原酸、绿原酸、咖啡酸、芦丁、异槲皮苷、槲皮素-3-O-(6″-O-丙二酰基)-β-D-葡萄糖苷、紫云英苷。所建立的基准评价方法为桑叶配方颗粒质量标准的制定及其后续大规模生产提供了数据基础。     

Jensen's alpha and the market‐timing puzzle

Theory predicts that market‐timing activities bias Jensen's alpha (JA). However, empirical studies have failed to find consistent evidence of this bias. We tackle this puzzle in a nested model analysis and show that the bias contains an exogenous market component that is unrelated to market‐timing skill. In a comprehensive empirical analysis of US mutual funds, we find that the timing‐induced bias in JA is mainly driven by this market component, which is uncorrelated with measured timing activities. Measures of total performance that allow for timing activities are virtually identical to JA, even if timing activities are present in the evaluated fund. Hence, we conclude that JA is a sufficient measure of total performance.     

三维视角下农民土地财产权的实现

研究目的:从时间性、社会性、空间性三维解读农民土地财产权的基本特征,进而探究其实现路径。研究方法:规范分析法、文献研究法。研究结果:(1)农民土地财产权由国家配置,呈现出开放性结构;(2)农民土地财产权本质上具有关系性,负有社会功能;(3)农民土地财产权受土地属性限制,在个人自治与公共利益互动平衡中动态发展。研究结论:农民土地财产权需要双重实现,公法上可以从基本权利的功能入手限定国家干预范围;私法上确立其独立民事权利地位,并借助集体成员概念明确成员权利和成员义务。     

Subnational home market bias in Vietnam: Evidence from enterprise‐level data

This paper contributes to the home (market) bias literature where administrative or political borders limit trade across borders. Home bias is well documented at the national and subnational level. To sort out macro (e.g., location characteristics) and micro (e.g., enterprise characteristics) factors behind home bias, we use small and medium‐sized enterprise (SME) data from Vietnam. Using the fractional multinomial logit model, we find that the proportion of SME sales outside of their home markets is positively associated with enterprise size, age, number of business association memberships and the distance of SMEs' most important supplier. In contrast, the proportion of SME sales to neighbouring provinces is negatively associated with the share of SME production for final consumption. Besides enterprise‐level frictions, market characteristics matter too. The proportion of SME sales to customers in their home markets is negatively associated with home or neighbouring provinces' governance quality, while the proportion of sales to customers in neighbouring provinces is positively associated with these areas' governance quality. These suggest that good governance frees SME resources for use in selling to less familiar markets.     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

Environmental proactivity,competitive strategy,and market performance: The mediating role of environmental reputation

This article examines the impact of small and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) proactive environmental strategy on market performance through the mediating mechanism of environmental reputation. In addition, we investigate the potential moderating role of competitive strategies on the environmental reputation-market performance nexus. Data were collected from 223 SMEs. Using the hierarchical multiple regression analysis, the results show that a proactive environmental strategy positively enhances environmental reputation. Also, the influence of proactively environmental strategy on market performance is mediated by environmental reputation. In addition, our findings show the relationship between environmental reputation and market performance is greater for firms that adopt the differentiation strategy but not significant for firms adopting the low-cost and integrated strategies. Our study offers several theoretical and practical implications.     

Private benefits from control block trades in the Spanish stock exchange

A control block trade can be explained by the expectation of financial gains, shared by all shareholders, or by the expectation of private benefits, exclusive to the buyer and possibly at the expense of other shareholders’ rents. The market for corporate control contributes to social welfare when it improves the efficiency of the allocation of resources. When the objective of a block transaction is private benefits, social welfare may be negatively impacted as minority shareholders could withdraw from the market. Therefore the estimation of private benefits would allow the efficiency of the market for corporate control to be assessed. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to calculate private benefits in the Spanish market for partial control. Using a sample of partial control transactions over the period 1990–2016, we find that the median of private benefits is negative, therefore it appears that there is no inefficient use of resources in the Spanish partial control market as a whole, however private costs are detected. The variability of private benefits is explained in a significant way by variables related to the control structure of the target firm, such as the controlling position of the buyer after the transaction, the contestability of control and the cross-shareholdings between the buyer and large shareholders. Performance and the size of the firm are significant as well.     

Can Direct Payments Facilitate Agricultural Commercialisation: Evidence from a Transition Country

We investigate the impact of direct payments on agricultural commercialisation in Kosovo. Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in Europe but, with European assistance, provides substantial funds to support agriculture, made up of many small and often semi‐subsistence farms. Thus, the effect of this support is a central policy issue. Identifying the effect of direct payments on market participation faces endogeneity issues arising from the possible simultaneous determination of participation in support programmes and market participation. In order to achieve proper identification of the endogenous direct payments, we use a strategy of targeted identification search that employs several different methodological approaches. We find that direct payments for fruit and vegetables, and those for cereals and oilseeds have a positive effect on market participation. However, we cannot identify any definite effect of livestock payments.